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Abstract
The run-up in oil prices since 2004 coincided with growing investment in commod-
ity markets and increased price comovement among di⁄erent commodities. We assess
whether speculation in the oil market played a role in driving this salient empirical
pattern. We identify oil shocks from a large dataset using a factor-augmented vector
autoregressive (FAVAR) model. This method is motivated by the fact that a small
scale VAR is not infomationally su¢ cient to identify the shocks. The main results are
as follows: (i) While global demand shocks account for the largest share of oil price ￿ uc-
tuations, speculative shocks are the second most important driver. (ii) The comovement
between oil prices and the prices of other commodities is mainly explained by global
demand shocks. (iii) The increase in oil prices over the last decade is mainly driven by
the strength of global demand. However, speculation played a signi￿cant role in the oil
price increase between 2004 and 2008 and its subsequent collapse. Our results support
the view that the recent oil price increase is mainly driven by the strength of global
demand but that the ￿nancialization process of commodity markets also played a role.
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1"[...] The sharp increases and extreme volatility of oil prices have led observers to
suggest that some part of the rise in prices re￿ects a speculative component arising from
the activities of traders in the oil markets. " ￿ Ben S. Bernanke (2004)1
1 Introduction
The long-standing debate regarding the sources of oil price ￿ uctuations recently intensi￿ed due to
the dramatic rise in oil prices. Kilian (2009) highlights that oil price shocks can have very di⁄erent
e⁄ects on the real price of oil depending on the origin of the shock. He concludes that oil prices have
historically been driven by demand factors. Since this contribution, an impressive list of empirical
studies have investigated the e⁄ects of di⁄erent types of oil shocks, agreeing with Kilian￿ s (2009)
conclusion.2
While this ￿nding has gained strong support, the developments in the oil market in the past ten
years have been so dramatic that they took many market participants by surprise. In fact, some
of them have suggested that the recent run-up in oil prices "(...) has not been driven by supply
and demand."3 Tang and Xiong (2011) suggest that a speculative component may be behind the
recent boom in commodity prices. This idea has fueled an ongoing debate on imposing additional
regulatory limits on trading in oil futures (see Masters, 2008), making the link between speculation
and oil prices relevant from a policy standpoint.
One striking characteristic of the oil market over the past decade is that large ￿nancial insti-
tutions, hedge funds, and other investment funds have invested billions of dollars in the futures
market to take advantage of oil price changes. Evidence suggests that commodities have become
a recognized asset class within the investment portfolios of ￿nancial institutions as a means to
diversify risks such as in￿ ation or equity market weakness (see Geman, 2005, and Gorton and
Rouwenhorst, 2006). It is estimated that assets allocated to commodity index trading strategies
rose from $13 billion in 2004 to $260 billion as of March 2008. This increased volume of trading
1From "Oil and the Economy," remarks by then-Governor Bernanke delivered at the Dis-
tinguished Lecture Series, Darton College, Albary, Georgia, on October 21, 2004 (available at
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20041021/default.htm).
2See also Baumeister et al. (2010); Baumeister and Peersman (2010); Kilian and Hicks (2009); Kilian (2010);
Kilian and Murphy (2011a, b); Kilian and Park (2009); Lombardi and Van Robays (2011); and Peersman and Van
Robays (2009, 2010). Note that these results build on the work of Barsky and Kilian (2002), who discuss the reverse
causality from macroeconomic aggregates to oil prices.
3This comes from a 2006 interview of Lord Browne, Group Chief Executive of British
Petroleoum, as reported in "The Role of Market Speculation in Rising Oil and Gas Prices: A
Need to Put the Cop Back on the Beat," Permanent Subcommitee on Investigations, Commit-
tee on Homeland Security and Governmental A⁄airs, United States Senate, June 2006, (available at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SenatePrint10965MarketSpecReportFINAL.pdf?attempt=2). We
note that this report also contains testimonies from other CEOs along the same lines.
2had a number of e⁄ects on commodity markets. According to Hamilton and Wu (2011), it changed
the nature of risk premia in the crude oil futures market. In particular, the compensation to the
long position became smaller on average but more volatile. Tang and Xiong (2011) note that the
growing ￿ ow of investment to commodity markets coincided with an increase in the price of oil and
a higher price comovement between di⁄erent commodities.
We analyze whether speculation in the oil market was a driver of this empirical pattern. To this
end, we assess the role of supply, demand and speculative shocks as drivers of oil prices. Shocks
are identi￿ed by imposing economically meaningful sign restrictions on the impulse responses of a
subset of variables. Supply shocks, which have historically been the center of attention in the oil
literature (see Hamilton, 1985, 2003; Kilian, 2008a, and b), refer to changes in the current physical
availability of crude oil. Global demand shocks, which are the focus of recent research (see footnote
2), re￿ ect an increase in demand for all industrial commodities triggered by the state of the global
business cycle. Speculative shocks have attracted the attention of a new strand of the literature,
fueled by the oil market developments of the past decade.
In our analysis we consider two types of speculative shocks. The ￿rst one, which we call oil
inventory demand shock, is proposed by Kilian and Murphy (2011a) and refers to a shock to the
demand for oil inventories driven by shifts in expectations not otherwise captured by the demand
and supply shocks. Speci￿cally, this shock represents a shift of the demand curve along an upward
sloping supply curve as a consequence of an increase in inventory demand. The second one, named
speculative shock, is inspired by Hamilton (2009a), where he conjectures an alternative channel
through which speculation can a⁄ect the physical side of the market. In particular, he describes
how speculators can a⁄ect the incentives faced by producers by purchasing a large number of futures
contracts and signalling higher expected spot prices. Producers, revising their expectations for the
price of oil for future delivery, will hold oil back from the market and accumulate inventories. As
explained by Hotelling￿ s (1931) principle, it would bene￿t oil producers to forgo current production
so they can sell oil at higher future prices. As Hamilton (2009a) describes, we could think that oil
market participants were misled by the speculative purchases of oil futures contracts into reducing
current production in response. Although this last type of shock may not be directly linked to
fundamentals, because it a⁄ects future spot prices it in￿ uences the current behavior of oil market
participants, modifying the incentives to accumulate (above and below ground) inventories. In fact,
this corresponds to a contemporaneous shift in the demand for above and below ground inventories.4
Kilian and Murphy (2011a) refer to such shocks as speculative supply shocks.
Although the latter speculative shock is motivated by the recent trend of investment in commod-
4In the presence of higher expected prices, we should expect an increase in the demand for inventories, as well as a
reduction of oil supply (i.e. increase in the demand for below ground inventories). See Appendix E for more details.
3ity markets, the same response on the producer￿ s side can arise in the absence of futures markets.
This will happen if the oil price is expected to increase relative to production costs and current
production is reduced as producers withhold some energy resources to sell at a greater pro￿t at a
future date. Davidson et al. (1974) ￿nd evidence supporting the existence of speculative activity
before futures markets were developed. The presence of futures markets may exacerbate the role of
shocks to the expectation of future oil prices, but clearly the concept of speculation that we identify
is a general one.
In terms of methodology, we re-examine the role of speculation relative to supply and demand
forces as drivers of oil prices using a factor-augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model. Our
paper is the ￿rst application of this method in the context of the oil market. Bernanke et al. (2005)
provide an extensive description of the advantages of the FAVAR approach. In particular, they argue
that the small number of variables in a VAR may not span the information sets used by market
participants, who are known to follow hundreds of data series (see also Giannone et al., 2005). We
provide evidence that a small-scale VAR for the oil market, typically used in the literature, is not
informationally su¢ cient to identify the shocks. Therefore, we use a set of factors to summarize the
bulk of aggregate ￿ uctuations of a large dataset, which includes both macroeconomic and ￿nancial
variables of the G7 countries and a rich set of commodity prices. Evidence suggests that some of
these factors summarize complementary measures of economic activity and ￿nancial variables, such
as the exchange rate and the stock market.
The use of a FAVAR allows us to investigate the transmission of oil shocks to a large number of
variables. Therefore, we can analyze the conditional correlations between oil prices and the price of
other commodities. It turns out that global demand shocks are the main drivers of the comovement
among commodity prices, consistent with the narrative in Kilian (2009). However, the speculation
shock is also associated with a positive comovement between oil and the price of other commodities,
even though it is smaller in magnitude than the correlation given by global demand shocks. This is
consistent with the results of Tang and Xiong (2011) and suggests that the speculation shock that
we identify is picking up the e⁄ects of ￿nancialization driven by the rapid growth of commodity
index investment as emphasized by, among others, Singleton (2011). The correlation between oil
prices and the prices of other commodities is negative for supply and inventory demand shocks,
implying that they cannot be responsible for the comovement in commodity prices.
Interpreting oil price ￿ uctuations over the past decade under the lens of our model reveals
that speculation shocks began to play a relevant role as drivers of oil price increases in 2004.
Interestingly, this timing is consistent with other studies documenting the increase in investment
￿ ows into commodity markets in 2004 (see Singleton, 2011, and Tang and Xiong, 2011), as well
4as anecdotal evidence (see, e.g., Masters, 2008).5 Although speculation played a signi￿cant role in
driving oil price increases between 2004 and 2008, and their subsequent decline, the increase in
oil prices over the last decade is due mainly to the strength of global demand, in line with Kilian
(2009), and most of the literature thereafter.
Our paper is also related to a strand of the literature that studies the e⁄ects of speculation
on the oil spot price using data on traders￿positions in the futures market (see, for example,
Haigh et al. 2007, B￿y￿ksahin et al. 2008, and B￿y￿ksahin and Harris, 2011). These studies ￿nd
mixed evidence on the role of ￿nancial activity in oil spot prices. Using a di⁄erent methodology,
Lombardi and Van Robays (2011) provide evidence that ￿nancial investors caused oil prices to
diverge from the level justi￿ed by fundamentals. In contrast to this literature, our aim is to
reconcile the argument of speculation with what happens on the physical side of the market. In
this way, we o⁄er a complementary approach. Overall, we ￿nd evidence consistent with the fact
that the main determinant of oil price ￿ uctuations is global demand. Therefore, our results provide
additional support to the demand driven explanations of the recent developments in the oil market.
Nevertheless, speculation shocks are also relevant, suggesting that speculative activities, by a⁄ecting
the expectation formation of market participants can a⁄ect the incentives faced by operators in the
oil market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric method.
Section 3 describes the data, the identi￿cation strategy, and discusses the results of the standard
VAR and the FAVAR models. Section 4 incorporates speculation shocks into the FAVAR. Section
5 presents the main results, and Section 6 o⁄ers some concluding remarks.
2 Econometric Method
2.1 The Model
Since Kilian (2009) a large body of literature has focused on disentangling the determinants of
oil price ￿ uctuations using structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) on a small set of variables.
In this framework, structural shocks are identi￿ed as a linear combination of the residuals of the
linear projection of a low-dimensional vector of variables onto their lagged values. This implies
that all the relevant information for the identi￿cation of the shocks is included in the small set
of variables in the VAR ￿ that is, that the identi￿ed structure of the shocks is fundamental (see
5Alquist and Kilian (2007) show evidence of increased trader activity from 2004 to 2007. The authors measure
the relative importance of speculative activities by the number of noncommercial spread positions expressed as a
percentage of the reportable open interest positions. They ￿nd a marked increase in the percent share of noncom-
mercial spread positions since December 2003, suggesting that speculation intensi￿ed. The authors highlight that the
increase in the non-commercial spread position in the last part of the sample is unprecedented.
5Hansen and Sargent, 1991, Lippi and Reichlin, 1993, 1994, and Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2007).
However, additional information available in other economic series excluded from the VAR may be
relevant to the dynamic relation implied in the VAR model. Excluding this information can have
implications for the estimated model. In particular, the identi￿cation of the shocks and their related
transmission mechanism can be severely biased by the omission of relevant information. One way to
address this issue is to augment the information set of the VAR by including a small set of principal
components (factors) that summarize the information from a wider set of variables (see Forni et
al., 2009). In this section, we provide a summary of the factor-augmented vector autoregressive
(FAVAR) model approach that we use in the empirical section. For additional details, see Bernanke
et al. (2005).
The use of the FAVAR model entails two major advantages with respect to low-dimensional
VAR models. First, it does not require a stance on speci￿c observable measures corresponding
precisely to some theoretical constructs. In empirical models of the oil market, for example, we
need to include a measure of the global demand pressures, which can be captured by an unobservable
factor. Second, a natural by-product of the FAVAR model is obtaining impulse response functions
for any variable included in the dataset. This allows us to document the e⁄ects of identi￿ed shocks
on a broader set of commodities and will be particularly useful as a validation of the di⁄erent shocks
identi￿ed. For example, we can look at the comovement between oil prices and the price of other
commodities.
Let xit denote the generic variable of a panel of N stationary time series, where both the N
and T dimensions are very large. In the factor model, each variable in our dataset, xit, is expressed
as the sum of a common component and an idiosyncratic component that are mutually orthogonal
and unobservable:
xit = ￿ift + ￿it; (1)
where ft represents r unobserved factors (N ￿ r), ￿i is the r-dimensional vector of factor loadings,
and ￿it are idiosyncratic components of xit uncorrelated with ft:
The idiosyncratic components are weakly correlated across the cross-sectional dimension. We
can consider them as shocks that a⁄ect a single variable or a small group of variables. For example,
in the speci￿c dataset under analysis the idiosyncratic components will incorporate shocks to a
single country that are not large enough to a⁄ect all other countries. The idiosyncratic components
also include a measurement error that is uncorrelated across variables. Allowing for a measurement
error is particularly useful in our context. In fact, low-dimensional VARs typically used to analyze
the oil market include some proxy for global demand. However, any observable measure of this
6general concept is likely to be contaminated by measurement errors.6
The common component is a linear combination of a relatively small number of r (static) factors
and is generally responsible for the bulk of the comovement between the variables in the dataset.7
For example, in our case, they could re￿ ect movements in global economic activity.
Let yt denote the M-dimensional vector of variables describing the dynamics of the oil market.
The VAR literature assumes that the relevant information set for the identi￿cation of the shocks
is summarized by its lagged values. However, additional information available in other economic
series not included in the VAR may be relevant to the dynamics of the oil market. Therefore, we











where ￿(L) is the lag polynomial in the lag operator L, and ut is the error term with mean zero
and variance-covariance matrix ￿.
Kilian (2009) was the ￿rst to emphasize the importance of global demand forces in the deter-
mination of oil prices. In fact, he includes a proxy for global economic activity among the relevant
variables for identifying the structural shocks. In a way, this low-dimension VAR can be considered
a speci￿c version of (2), where the proxy for global economic activity is considered to be a single
observable factor. We complement the existing empirical evidence by allowing the stochastic di-
mension of the large dataset of macroeconomic and ￿nancial data (i.e., the world economy) to be
larger than 1. This will be true whenever the global economy is a⁄ected by more than one source
of common shocks.8 The speci￿cation (2) highlights that the low-dimensional VARs will not be
able to identify the structural shocks whenever they fail to incorporate all the relevant information
embodied in the factors. This condition can be easily veri￿ed by looking at a Granger causality test
of the low-dimensional VAR with respect to the information summarized by the factors (Giannone
and Reichlin, 2006).
Our application includes the growth rate of oil production, inventories, and real oil prices in
yt, whereas the e⁄ect of global demand is accounted for by the unobservable factors. We do not
impose the restriction that any of the oil variables must be an observable factor in the system.9 This
6As Bernanke et al. (2005) describe, the concept of "economic activity" may not be accurately represented by an
observable measure. A similar argument is also made in Giannone et al. (2005).
7Notice that the static factor model considered here is not very restrictive since an underlying dynamic factor
model can always be written in static form (see Stock and Watson, 2005).
8This is a realistic assumption that holds even if one is not willing to assume the presence of global shocks. Indeed,
the presence of interconnections among economies in the global markets gives rise to a factor representation of the
data akin to (1) (see, e.g., Chudick et al., 2011).
9This speci￿cation is consistent with the results in Section 3.3 where we test whether any of the oil variables can
be considered as an observable factor.
7implies that the identi￿ed shocks need not be global shocks but does not rule out the possibility.10
We pursue this approach due to contrasting evidence on the impact of oil shocks on the global
business cycle. Some evidence suggests that oil shocks are global. For example, the seminal papers
of Hamilton (1983, 1985) show that oil prices have been among the key driving forces behind most
U.S. recessions. By contrast, Kilian (2008a,b) suggest that oil supply shocks played a minor role in
the evolution of the US and other G7 economies since the 1970s, although they mattered for some
historical episodes.
2.2 Estimation and identi￿cation of the structural shocks
We estimate the model using a two-step procedure. In the ￿rst step, the unobserved factors and
loadings are estimated using the principal components method described by Stock and Watson
(2002b). In the second step, we use the estimated factors along with the oil variables to estimate
our FAVAR model.11 Stock and Watson (2002a) prove the consistency of the principal components
estimator in an approximate factor model when both cross-sectional and time sizes, N and T, go to
in￿nity. The two-step procedure is chosen for computational convenience. Moreover, the principal
components approach does not require strong distributional assumptions.12
We are interested in analyzing the impact of di⁄erent types of oil shocks within the framework
of a FAVAR model. To give a structural interpretation to the shocks we follow the approach based
on sign restrictions proposed by Canova and De Nicol￿ (2002) and Uhlig (2005). We identify the
shocks by imposing economically meaningful sign restrictions on the impulse responses of a subset
of variables. Speci￿cally, let Q denote an orthonormal matrix such that Q0Q = I. The structural
shocks can be recovered as ￿t = Qut. The orthonormal matrices Q are found from the eigenvalue
decomposition of a random q ￿ q matrix (where q = 3 + r) drawn from a normal distribution with
unitary variance (see Rubio-Ramirez et al., 2010). The corresponding structural impulse response
function to the common component for the oil variables can be recovered as
yt = [I3;03￿r][I3+r￿￿(L)L]
￿1 Q0￿t;
where the moving average representation of the ith variable in the dataset can be written as
xit = [01￿3;￿i][I3+r￿￿(L)L]
￿1 Q0￿t:
10An alternative way to model the oil market in a large information framework would be to estimate a dynamic
factor model along the lines of Forni et al. (2009); however, in this framework we would be implicitly constraining
the oil shocks to be global shocks.
11The lag length is equal to 4. Setting a longer lag length (in line with the recommendation of Hamilton and
Herrera, 2004) does not a⁄ect the results.
12Doz et al. (2011) show that likelihood-based and two-step procedures perform quite similarly in approximating
the space spanned by latent factors. In addition, Bernanke et al. (2005) ￿nd that the single-step Bayesian likelihood
method delivers essentially the same results as the two-step principal components method.
8Since the unobserved factors are estimated and then included as regressors in the FAVAR model
the two-step approach might su⁄er from the "generated regressor" problem. In order to account for
estimation uncertainty, we adopt a non-overlapping block bootstrap technique. We partition the
T￿(N+3) matrix of data Z =[yit xit] 8i;t into S sub-matrices Zs (blocks), s = 1;:::;S; of dimension
￿ ￿ (N + 3), where ￿ is an integer part of T=S: In the empirical Section we set ￿ = 20 (equivalent
to ￿ve year blocks). An integer hs between 1 and S is drawn randomly with reintroduction S






dimension ￿S ￿ (N + 3) and the corresponding impulse responses are estimated.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
The estimation period runs from the second quarter of 1972 to the end of 2009. The dataset consists
of 151 series which includes macroeconomic and ￿nancial variables of the G7 countries as well as oil
market data, measures of global economic activity and a rich set of commodity prices. Appendix A
provides a complete description of the data and sources. The panel is unbalanced and therefore the
extraction of the factors makes use of the EM algorithm as discussed in Stock and Watson (2002b).
The set of macroeconomic and ￿nancial variables includes output, prices, labor market indica-
tors, trade, interest rates, stock market price indices and exchange rates and is sourced from the
International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
The real oil price is the average oil price taken from the IFS de￿ ated by the U.S. CPI. World oil
production is obtained from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Given the lack of data on crude
oil inventories for other countries, we follow Kilian and Murphy (2011a) in using the data for total
U.S. crude oil inventories provided by the Energy Information Administration (EIA), scaled by the
ratio of OECD petroleum stocks over U.S. petroleum stocks.13 The price of other commodities is
from the IFS and considered in real terms after being de￿ ated by the U.S. CPI. Two proxies of
global economic activity are also included in the dataset. The ￿rst one is an IFS index of aggregate
industrial production and the second is the measure of global real economic activity based on data
for dry cargo bulk freight rates as proposed by Kilian (2009).14
13Petroleum stocks sourced from the EIA include crude oil (including strategic reserves) as well as un￿nished oils,
natural gas plant liquids, and re￿ned products. Following Kilian and Murphy (2011a) we treat the OECD data as
a proxy for global petroleum inventories given that the EIA does not report data for non-OECD economies. Since
consistent series for OECD petroleum stocks are not available not available prior to 1987.4, we follow Kilian and
Murphy (2011a) and extrapolate the percent change in OECD inventories backwards at the rate of growth of U.S.
petroleum inventories.
14This measure is available from Lutz Kilian￿ s website at monthly frequency. We use the last month of each quarter
93.2 Su¢ cient Information and the Choice of Factors
A natural question at this stage is whether our large dataset contains valuable information with
respect to a small-scale VAR typically used in the literature to characterize the e⁄ects of oil shocks.
Therefore, we use the procedure described in Forni and Gambetti (2011) to test whether the small-
scale VAR is informationally su¢ cient to identify the shocks. The method uses the Gelper and
Croux (2007) multivariate extension of the out-of-sample Granger causality test. To implement
the method we proceed as follows. We set the maximum number of static factors to be r = 6
and compute the corresponding 6 principal components. Then, we test whether the principal
components Granger-cause the variables of the VAR. If the null of no Granger causality is not
rejected for any of the successive combinations of principal components, the variables of the VAR
are informationally su¢ cient. Otherwise, information su¢ ciency is rejected and the set of variables
under consideration does not contain enough information to estimate the structural shocks. In this
case at least one factor should be added to the estimation. We proceed by augmenting the VAR
with an additional factor and repeat the process until the alternative hypothesis is always rejected
for any number of the remaining factors up to the speci￿ed maximum number of factors.
Table 1 reports the (bootstrapped) p-values of the Granger causality test for the VAR and
VAR augmented with the factors. Two measures of global economic activity have been used in
the literature. Therefore, we consider 2 variants of a 4-variable VAR, which include oil produc-
tion, oil inventories, real oil price, and real economic activity. The ￿rst VAR (Panel A) measures
real economic activity by an index of aggregate industrial production (as in e.g., Baumeister and
Peersman, 2011). The second VAR (Panel B) includes a measure of global real economic activity
based on dry cargo freight rates as proposed by Kilian (2009) and used in Kilian and Murphy
(2011a). The ￿rst column of each panel presents the p-value for the null that the ￿rst six principal
components do not Granger-cause the variables of the VAR. Overall, we ￿nd that the variables of
the VAR are Granger-caused by the ￿rst six principal components. This implies that the VAR is
not informationally su¢ cient and motivates the use of a FAVAR to identify the shocks. Since the
null is rejected, we proceed by augmenting the VAR with factors until we fail to reject the null.
For both speci￿cations we are not able to reject the informational su¢ ciency of the FAVAR once 4
factors are added to the baseline VAR.
[Table 1 about here]
We also implement the Bai and Ng (2002) test to determine the number of factors. This test
suggests using 3 factors. We choose 4, consistent with the su¢ cient information test. However, our
to obtain the quarterly index.
10results are robust to the estimation of the FAVAR with 3 factors.15
3.3 Empirical Factors
Before proceeding to describe our identi￿cation method it is interesting to consider to what extent
observable economic variables span the same information of the unobserved factors. Bai and Ng
(2006) propose a test of this hypothesis based on the t-statistic
￿t(j) =
b zjt ￿ zjt p
d var(b zjt)
; (3)
where b zjt(= b ￿jb ft) is the least square projection of the variable zjt on the estimated latent factors
and the associate variance is constructed as detailed in Bai and Ng (2006). Two statistics can be
used to test the null hypothesis that the observable variable can be considered an exact factor (i.e.
b zjt is an exact linear combination of ft): A(j) is the frequency that the t-statistic, j￿t(j)j; exceeds
the 5% asymptotic critical value, and M(j) is the maximum deviation of the statistic from zero.
Given our sample size, the associated 5% critical value is 3.6. The ￿rst two columns of Table 2 show
the results of these statistics for the oil variables included in yt and the two measures of economic
activity. Appendix C presents the statistics for all the variables of the dataset. From Table 2 it
follows that none of the variables can be considered an observable factor of our dataset.
[Table 2 about here]
Requiring that an observable factor is an exact linear combination of the latent factors is a
rather strong assumption. Indeed, it could be the case that an observable series is not an exact
factor in the mathematical sense but still matches the variation of the latent factors very closely.
The last two columns report statistical measures of how good zjt is as a proxy for the factors.
The NS (j) statistic, i.e. the noise-to-signal ratio, and the coe¢ cient of determination R2 (j), are
de￿ned as
NS (j) =







15Appendix B shows the impulse responses for di⁄erent numbers of factors. Substantial di⁄erences exist with
respect to the version with no factors (or only one factor). For example, movements in oil production in the FAVAR
with more than one factor are transitory, whereas they remain persistent in the VAR and FAVAR with one factor.
Similarly, the e⁄ects on oil prices seem to be smaller in the FAVAR with more than one factor. As a result, the
response of real activity is also smaller, and tends to revert now to zero. In addition to these quantitative di⁄erences,
it is important to note that the results of the information su¢ ciency test suggest that the di⁄erences across models
are statistically signi￿cant. We also note that the results are unchanged when we include an additional factor speci￿c
to commodity prices.
11If zjt is an exact factor, the population value of NS(j) is zero. Therefore, a large NS(j) indicates
that there is an important departure of zjt from the latent factors. Similarly, the R2 (j) would
be unity if zjt is an exact factor, and zero if the observed variable is irrelevant. Table 2 shows
that aggregate industrial production, a widely used indicator of aggregate economic activity, has
the highest R2 (j) and the lowest NS(j), suggesting a strong relation with the latent factors. Not
surprisingly, the Kilian proxy of economic activity also has a strong relation with the latent factors,
although considerably weaker than the one of aggregate industrial production. For the oil variables
the association with the factors is generally weak.
Since the factors are identi￿ed only up to an orthogonal transformation, a detailed discussion
of the individual factors is unwarranted. However, looking at the ￿t of the regression of the
individual series in our dataset against each of the factors can still give an idea of the economic
concepts behind the factors.16 Figure 1 plots each measure of economic activity together with the
projection of the variable on the factor with the highest explanatory power and the projection of
the variable on all four latent factors. The results are quite interesting. While the ￿rst factor
primarily loads on aggregate industrial production, the second factor has the highest explanatory
power for the Kilian measure of economic activity. This suggests that these two factors summarize
complementary economic concepts. In fact, the analysis suggests that the ￿rst factor summarizes
a more general measure of the aggregate business cycle, explaining the main bulk of comovement
among the main macroeconomic variables. By contrast, the second factor seems to be a measure
of aggregate demand, loading primarily on US real personal consumption. In addition, this factor
also loads on some leading indicators, such as interest rate spreads, corroborating the conjecture
by Kilian (2009) that this proxy of real economic activity is more forward looking than other direct
measures of the global business cycle. 17
[Figure 1 about here]
While the ￿rst two factors are associated with real economic concepts, the last two capture
￿nancial variables, such as exchange rates and the stock market (see Appendix C). This is in line
16Looking at the ￿t of each economic variable in the dataset can help us to gauge the validity of our empirical
strategy. We would expect some variables not to display a signi￿cant ￿t with the factors. For example, the price
of iron ore, which was regulated until recently, loads weakly on the factors. By contrast, other variables which are
particularly sensitive to global demand forces, such as copper prices, display a striking ￿t.
17We note that the ￿t of the second factor to the measure of real economic activity becomes less strong in the last
part of the sample. A potential explanation for this is that this measure of real economic activity is calculated from dry
cargo bulk freight rates. The developments in the shipping industry in the past decade might have signi￿cantly a⁄ected
this measure. It is worth mentioning that freight rates have become a relevant tradable ￿ commodity￿for specialized
￿nancial institutions (see Geman, 2005). In fact, in the past decade their volatility has increased tremendously: They
are now twice as volatile as commodity prices and four times as volatile as stock prices (see Alizadeh and Nomikos,
2011).
12with Kilian and Park (2009) who analyze the interaction between oil shocks and the stock market,
as well as the argument that ￿ uctuations in the dollar can play a role in the determination of
oil prices (see, for example, Frankel, 2008, and Akram, 2009).The results of the test of su¢ cient
information in section 3.2 suggest that these forces are relevant for a correct identi￿cation of the
oil shocks.
3.4 Identi￿cation
In this subsection we discuss the sign restrictions imposed to estimate oil supply, global demand,
and oil inventory demand shocks, which are the focus of the recent literature. We incorporate the
speculation shock in the next section. Our identi￿cation, summarized in Table 3, builds on those
of Baumeister and Peersman (2011) and Kilian and Murphy (2011a, b). An oil supply shock is
de￿ned as any unanticipated shift in the oil supply curve that results in an opposite movement of oil
production and the real price of crude oil. During an oil supply disruption inventories are depleted
in an e⁄ort to smooth oil production and real activity contracts. We impose a sign restriction on
inventories to disentangle this shock from the speculative shock (see Section 4).
[Table 3 about here]
An oil inventory demand shock is "a shock to the demand of above ground oil inventories arising
from forward looking behavior" (Kilian and Murphy, 2011a, page 7). Kilian and Murphy (2011a)
refer to this shock as "speculative demand shock." We use a di⁄erent name to distinguish it from
the alternative speculative shock analyzed in the next section. An oil inventory demand shock arises
from the possibility of a sudden shortage in future production or expectations of higher demand in
the future. A similar situation can occur in the presence of uncertainty about future oil supplies,
driven, for example, by political instability in key oil-producing countries such as Nigeria, Iraq,
Venezuela, or Libya. A positive oil inventory demand shock raises demand for inventories, causing
the level of inventories and real oil prices to increase. Inventories of crude oil increase so that supply
can meet demand in the event of supply shortfalls or unexpected shifts in demand (see Alquist and
Kilian, 2010). The increase in the real price of oil provides an incentive for oil producers to increase
production. In addition, the increase in the real oil price causes a decline in real activity.
A global demand shock is driven by unexpected changes in global economic activity. This
represents shifts in demand for all industrial commodities (including oil) resulting from higher real
economic activity, triggered, for example, by rapid growth in China, India, and other emerging
economies (see Kilian and Hicks, 2009). This increase in the demand for oil will drive up its
real price. Oil production increases to satisfy the higher demand. The e⁄ect on oil inventories is
ambiguous.
13In addition to the sign restrictions, we follow Kilian and Murphy (2011b) and impose an upper
bound of 0.0257 for the response of the impact elasticity of oil supply with respect to the real price
jointly after both demand shocks. Annex 1 presents the results for di⁄erent elasticity bounds.
3.5 VAR and FAVAR
In this subsection we estimate a VAR and a FAVAR with three shocks and compare their results.18
Note that in the case of the FAVAR we impose sign restrictions on both measures of real economic
activity given that the two of them have been used in the literature. The impulse responses
obtained from the FAVAR and the VAR yield di⁄erences in terms of the magnitude and shape of
the responses (see Appendix D). Table 4 presents the forecast error variance decomposition of the
oil price to the three shocks using the VARs (with the two measures of economic activity) and the
FAVAR. The variance decomposition in both VARs is dominated by global demand shocks at all
horizons. The oil inventory demand shock also plays a signi￿cant role, accounting for about 10% to
30% of oil price ￿ uctuations in the VARs. The sum of the three shocks accounts for around 85% of
the oil price variation in both VARs, whereas in the FAVAR the three shocks explain only around
55% of oil price ￿ uctuations. In particular, the share of oil price ￿ uctuations explained by demand
forces decreases signi￿cantly, whereas the share driven by supply shocks remains largely robust.
Global demand shocks still account for the largest proportion of oil price ￿ uctuations, although the
share is smaller compared to the VAR. The oil inventory demand shock is the one most signi￿cantly
a⁄ected, as it now explains between 4% to 13% of the variation in oil prices.
[Table 4 about here]
The most important result from this comparison is the decrease in the role of demand forces
to explain oil price ￿ uctuations. These quantitative di⁄erences are relevant given that since Kilian
(2009) most of the recent literature points at demand forces as drivers of the oil price. The variance
decomposition of the FAVAR contains a large unexplained component. We conjecture that part of
this is due to speculation in the oil market. The next section addresses the identi￿cation of this
component.
3.6 Orthogonality
Despite the rejection of the informational su¢ ciency of the VAR, some shocks can still be correctly
identi￿ed from the low-dimensional VAR. This is true whenever the identi￿ed structural shocks
18The estimated VAR is not directly comparable with Kilian and Murphy (2011a). In particular, the authors use
monthly data, a di⁄erent stationarity transformation of the data, and impose additional restrictions. Our objective
is not to make a direct comparison of our results to theirs but to illustrate the potential implications of expanding
the VAR information set with factors.
14from the VAR are orthogonal to any available information at time t (for example, lagged values of
the factors). Otherwise, the identi￿ed shock cannot be considered structural (Forni and Gambetti,
2011).
The identi￿cation by sign restrictions does not identify a single model. Therefore, we investigate
the orthogonality of the shocks over all sets of identi￿ed impulse responses. Table 5 shows the
percentage of rejections of the F-test of orthogonality for each of the shocks identi￿ed from the
VAR with sign restrictions.19 Speci￿cally, for each possible set of shocks we ￿rst test whether
they are Granger-caused by lagged factors. We then report the number of rejected shocks (at the
10% level) over the total identi￿ed shocks. The results in the ￿rst row of the table imply that the
￿rst factor Granger-causes none or a very limited fraction of the shocks (see Section 3.3).20 This
result is consistent with the view that the ￿rst factor re￿ ects the business cycle and, consequently,
is captured by aggregate industrial production. The last row of Table 3 suggests that a linear
combination of 4 factors Granger-causes less than 1% of all the identi￿ed oil supply shocks, 58% of
all the identi￿ed global demand shocks, and about 86% of all the identi￿ed oil inventory demand
shocks. These results underline the results from the previous section. The demand shocks identi￿ed
from a small dimensional VAR are not orthogonal to the information of lagged factors and as a
consequence their in￿ uence can be overstated. Overall, these results highlight the importance of
augmenting the low-dimension VAR with the set of factors.
[Table 5 about here]
4 Augmented Model
In this section we extend the FAVAR model with three identi￿ed shocks as previously analyzed to
include speculation shocks. In this section we discuss the identifying restrictions to pin down the
speculative shock.
4.1 Identi￿cation of speculation shock
Hamilton (2009a) discusses how the ￿￿nancialization￿ of the oil market may play a role in the
determination of oil prices (along the lines of Masters, 2008). In particular, he explains how
the role of speculative activities can be reconciled with what happens in the physical side of the
19We do the test only for the VAR with aggregate industrial production as the analysis in Section 3.3. suggests
this as the preferred measure.
20The fact that the lagged ￿rst factor is orthogonal to the shocks of the VAR is consistent with the impulse responses
shown in Appendix B. There is little di⁄erence between the impulse responses of the VAR and the impulse responses
of the VAR augmented with one factor. This is consistent with the work of Kilian and Murphy (2011a) in that they
impose the stochastic dimension of the economy to be 1.
15oil market. In this spirit, Kilian and Murphy (2011a) identify a speculative shock in which oil
inventories increase, oil prices go up and oil production increases. Essentially, this is a shift of
the demand of inventories along an upward sloping supply curve. Appendix E presents a simple
model that justi￿es these restrictions. However, Hamilton (2009a) also conjectures the possibility
that ￿nancial speculation, by a⁄ecting the expected future spot prices (EtPt+1), can change the
incentives faced by producers, and therefore have an impact on the supply side of the market.
Following Frankel and Rose (2010), among others, speculation can be de￿ned as the purchase
of commodities (either in physical form or ￿nancial contracts) in anticipation of a ￿nancial gain at
the time of the resale. For example, a typical investment strategy for commodity traders consists
of taking a long-position in a futures contract at price Ft, selling it before it expires at the higher
price Pt+1 and using the proceeds to take a long position in another futures contract. If the
expectations are such that the expected future spot price EtPt+1 is higher than the futures price
Ft (EtPt+1 > Ft), more investment funds will take long positions in futures contracts. As the
number of buys of futures contracts exceeds the number of sells of expiring ones, futures prices
go up and with them the expected spot price.21 In the physical side of the market, as producers
expect a higher price of oil for future delivery (EtPt+1), they will hold oil back from the market and
accumulate inventories. Leaving more oil underground may enhance total pro￿ts on the producers￿
investment given that prices are expected to rise in the future (more rapidly than the average
market return). As explained by Hotelling￿ s (1931) principle, it would bene￿t oil producers to forgo
current production so they can sell the oil at higher future prices. In this way, oil producers will not
accommodate the upward trend in oil prices but rather decrease production (see also Jovanovich,
2007). As Hamilton (2009a) describes, we could think that oil-producing countries were misled by
the speculative purchases of oil futures contracts into reducing current production.22
Oil producers take future pro￿ts into account when deciding whether to produce today or to-
morrow, especially in the context of speculation, when prices are expected to increase in the future.
In contrast to an oil inventory demand shock, speculative shocks lead to inventory accumulation not
because of a fear of production shortage (which would generate a need for oil storage), but because
speculation itself leads to higher expected prices. The reduction in the oil available for current
use, resulting from lower production and increased (below ground) inventory holding, causes the
current spot oil price to rise. The same types of incentives can lead to an increase in the storage
21Ignoring the e⁄ect of risk premia, arbitrage would be such that Et (Pt+1) = (1 + rt)Ft. In this discussion we are
implicitly holding the real interest rate ￿xed.
22The equilibrium in the physical side of the market implies that inventories accumulate whenever production (Qt)
exceeds current consumption (Xt), i.e. It+1 ￿ It = Qt ￿ Xt. Therefore, when imposing our sign restriction for the
speculation shock we are implicitly assuming that the price elasticity of production is smaller than the price elasticity
of consumption; i.e the shift in supply is large enough to conteract the e⁄ect of the shift in demand. See Appendix
E for more details.
16of above ground inventories.23 A summary of the sign restrictions used to identify the speculative
component of the oil market is presented in the last row of Table 3. The intuition behind these
restrictions can be found in a simple model presented in Appendix E.
This set of sign restrictions is also consistent with Bernanke (2004), who describes how specu-
lation may drive oil prices up. He emphasizes that:
"(...) speculative traders who expect oil to be in increasingly short supply and oil prices to rise
in the future can back their hunches with their money by purchasing oil futures contracts on the
commodity exchange. Oil futures contracts represent claims to oil to be delivered at a speci￿ed price
and at a speci￿ed date and location in the future. If the price of oil rises as the traders expect￿ more
precisely, if the future oil price rises above the price speci￿ed in the contract￿ they will be able to
re-sell their claims to oil at a pro￿t.
If many speculators share the view that oil shortages will worsen and prices will rise, then their
demand for oil futures will be high and, consequently, the price of oil for future delivery will rise.
Higher oil futures prices in turn a⁄ect the incentives faced by oil producers. Seeing the high price of
oil for future delivery, oil producers will hold oil back from today￿ s market, adding it to inventory
for anticipated future sale.24 This reduction in the amount of oil available for current use will in
turn cause today￿ s price of oil to rise, an increase that can be interpreted as the speculative premium
in the oil price."
We do not impose a sign restriction on the response of real economic activity as there are
two forces that operate in opposite directions. The oil price increase would have a contractionary
e⁄ect on demand. We are not comfortable imposing such a restriction in this case, because we do
not want to rule out the possibility that increase of ￿nancial speculation is triggered by low real
interest rates as suggested by Frankel (1986 and 2008). As he explains, low interest rates may have
a number of e⁄ects on commodity markets. On the ￿nancial side, lower real rates reduce the cost
of "carry trade" in the commodity markets, amplifying the e⁄ect of a mismatch between expected
23Let us illustrate with a simple example. Assume the existence of a NYMEX futures contract that consists of
delivering 1,000 barrels of light sweet crude oil in one month to a buyer at Cushing, Oklahoma. The link between
futures price and the cash price at Cushing can be described as follows. A producer of crude oil is o⁄ered $80 per
barrel for 1,000 barrels of oil today. The same producer sees that the futures contract for delivery next month is
trading at $85 dollars. Instead of selling at $80 to the re￿ner today, the producer could sell a futures contract for
delivery next month at $85, store the 1,000 barrels for a month and be $5000 better o⁄ less the cost of a month
storage. The re￿ner needing the 1,000 barrels of crude today is then in the position that he must o⁄er the producer
something closer to the $85 NYMEX price to obtain the crude oil. This implies that producers themselves may end
up holding a higher level of above ground inventories. Notice that if the re￿ners also share the expectations of higher
future prices, they would want to increase their holding of inventories too. This allows them to cover for expected
higher prices of the input and to increase their future share of revenues. We implicitly assume that the market is not
completely vertically integrated. If it was, we would not observe a change in above ground inventories.
24Inventories in this case stand for below ground inventories. However, as explained above, we expect that above
ground inventories also increase, unless the market is perfectly vertically integrated.
17future spot prices and futures prices. In the physical side of the market, real rates represent the
opportunity cost of holding inventories both above and below ground. This channel is consistent
with our identifying restrictions and would imply a positive e⁄ect on real activity (see Frankel and
Rose, 2010).
The perspective on speculation that we describe in this Section is referred to as speculation by
oil producers in Kilian and Murphy (2011a). In fact, this is one of the components of their supply
shock, which we can disentangle from the standard supply shock only by imposing the additional
negative restriction on oil inventories following an oil supply shock. Speci￿cally, this restriction
imposes a production-smoothing rationale for holding inventories in the presence of supply shocks.
Kilian and Murphy (2011a) report evidence supporting this type of inventory behavior, so this
restriction seems reasonable.25
4.1.1 Speculation in the absence of futures markets
Given that futures markets were not developed until the 1980s, it is natural to ask whether specula-
tion would have the same characteristics in the absence of futures markets. We refer to speculation
in the oil market as speculation motivated by the recent trend of investment in commodity markets.
However, the same pattern can arise in the absence of developed futures markets if the oil price is
expected to increase relative to production costs and current production is reduced as producers
withhold some energy resources to sell at a greater "discounted" pro￿t at a future date (see David-
son et al., 1974). In fact, there is evidence supporting the presence of speculative activity in the
absence of futures markets. Davidson et al. (1974) describe how after President Nixon imposed
temporary price controls on oil produced in the US in 1971, the number of shut-in oil-producible
zones on the US outer continental shelf jumped from 14.3 per cent of the total completions of oil-
producible zones in 1971 to 44.4 per cent in 1972 and 44.5 per cent in 1973. This suggests an
explicit decision by producers to restrict available production ￿ ows.
The only role that futures markets are playing now is to foster the role of expectations of futures
prices (through price discovery) but the same general idea applies previous to their development.
Therefore, our sign restrictions to identify the speculative shock are valid for a broad concept of
speculation, also arising in the absence of futures markets.26
25Note that the sign restrictions imposed to identify the speculative shock could be consistent with a supply
disruption in which consumers expect the disruption to get worst and therefore inventory accumulation increases.
This would be consistent with a deliberate decision by oil producers to reduce current oil production (see, e.g.,
Hamilton, 2009b, p.188). However, this type of "oil supply" shock would manifest in a persistent upward trend in
the oil price. This is at odds with the results that we will present in Section 5.4.
26In the next section we check the sensitivity of our results to a subsample starting in 1986, when futures markets
were developed. They remain robust.
185 Empirical Results from Augmented Model
This Section presents the results of the augmented model with four shocks. We show the impulse
responses, and examine the e⁄ects of each shock on the comovement between commodity prices.
We also present the variance decompositions to evaluate how much of the variation in oil market
variables is accounted for by each of the shocks, and further examine the cumulative e⁄ect of the
sequence of historical shocks on the historical path of the real oil price by looking at the historical
decomposition. As a ￿nal step, we check the sensitivity of our results to a subsample starting in
1986.
5.1 Impulse responses
Figure 2 presents the median impulse responses of oil production, oil inventories, the real price of
oil, real economic activity, and industrial production to oil supply, oil inventory demand, global
demand, and speculative shocks.27 The impulse responses, estimated using a FAVAR with the sign
restrictions from Table 3, have been accumulated and are shown in levels.
[Figure 2 about here]
A negative oil supply shock is associated with a drop in production, which exhibits a temporary
decline. Oil inventories decrease in an e⁄ort to smooth production. The real price of oil rises
on impact, but this rise is only transitory. As production stabilizes, the e⁄ect on real oil prices
vanishes. The latter e⁄ect is re￿ ected in a transitory decline in aggregate industrial production and
real economic activity.
A positive oil inventory demand shock is associated with an immediate jump in the real price of
oil. The real oil price overshoots on impact and declines gradually. The initial increase is reversed
within ￿ve quarters. Inventories exhibit a persistent increase as in Kilian and Murphy (2011a) and
oil production increases. The e⁄ects on aggregate industrial production and real economic activity
are negative and small.
A positive global demand shock is associated with a large increase in aggregate industrial
production and real economic activity. As a consequence of high-demand pressures triggered by
rapid growth, real oil prices exhibit a large persistent increase with a peak after two quarters and
a very gradual decline. Oil production also rises, but only temporarily, and oil inventories decline
to satisfy the higher demand.
27Inoue and Kilian (2011) criticize the use of median impulse responses. We note that the results using the mean
impulse responses are almost identical. In addition, quantitatively similar results are found picking impulse responses
using the Fry and Pagan (2011) "median solution".
19A positive speculative shock is associated with a persistent increase in oil prices. Oil production
exhibits a signi￿cant decline because producers hold oil back from the market in anticipation of
higher prices in the future. The e⁄ects on real economic activity and industrial production are
positive, small and temporary.
5.2 Other commodity prices
The FAVAR model allows us to include a large number of variables such as the prices of di⁄erent
commodities. A natural question is what is the impact of each of the shocks on the price of
commodities? This question is of particular importance since it allows us to check whether the
speculative shock we are indentifying in fact arises from the ￿nancialization in the commodity
markets as described before. Barberis and Schleifer (2003) highlight that since index investors
typically focus on strategic portfolio allocation between the commodity class and other asset classes
(such as stocks and bonds) they tend to trade in and out of all commodities in a chosen index at
the same time.
Analyzing the response of other commodity prices also allows us to investigate an additional
dimension of the global demand shock. Kilian (2009) interprets this shock as an increase of demand
for all industrial commodities, fueled over the last decade by high growth in China and India (see
also Kilian, 2010; and Hicks and Kilian, 2009). If this is the case, demand for industrial commodities
such as copper and aluminium will rise because these commodities are used as inputs in production.
At the same time, demand for nonindustrial commodities is likely to rise as a result of increases in
income. Demand pressures would be associated with an increase in the price of all commodities.
In what follows we examine the conditional correlation between oil prices and the price of other
commodities.
5.2.1 Comovement in commodity prices
In order to shed some light on the comovement between commodity prices we decompose the
correlation between two variables into the contributions of the structural shocks of the FAVAR.
Following Den Haan and Sterk (2011), the correlation (COR) between the Kth-period-ahead
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Figure 3 shows the correlation of the real price of oil with four portfolios of commodity indexes,
calculated as an equal-weighted real price index for each commodity sector, as well as an aggregate
of all of them (Annex 2 presents the cross-sectional average pairwise correlation of all commodity
prices in response to the shocks identi￿ed).28 We obtain three main results. First, the largest
correlations are in response to a global demand shock. In this way, our results are consistent with
the view that the commodity price boom is due to rapid growth of the global economy. Second, the
speculation shock is associated with a positive correlation between oil prices and other commodities￿
prices even though this correlation is smaller than the one given by the global demand shock. By
contrast, the correlations between oil prices and the prices of other commodities are negative in
the case of oil supply and oil inventory demand shocks. This implies that the oil inventory demand
shock cannot be responsible for the comovement in commodity prices. This result shows that the
type of speculative shock that we are capturing seems to be more in line with the type of behavior
that would result from the ￿nancialization of commodity markets. Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990)
were the ￿rst to emphasize that comovement in commodity markets can be related to the behavior
of speculators who are long in several commodities at the same time. This is becoming the focus of
study of a growing literature in ￿nance (see Singleton, 2011 and Tang and Xiong, 2011). We note,
however, that the correlation in the case of the speculative shock is smaller than for the global
demand shock. This ￿nding is in line with Tang and Xiong (2011). Third, there is not a large
heterogeneity in the correlations between oil and each commodity sector.
[Figure 3 about here]
These results should be interpreted with care since they are an average result. The pattern of
comovement among commodities changes across time. Our results imply that comovement will be
stronger in periods in which global demand and/or speculation play a key role.
28The four porfolios are: Industrial metals, softs, grains, and precious metals. Industrial metals include copper,
aluminium, nickel, iron ore, and zinc. The soft sector is composed of cotton, tobacco, sugar, co⁄ee, and cacao. Grains
are sun￿ ower oil, palm oil, soybeans, wheat, rice and maize. Finally, precious metals include gold and silver. See
Geman (2005) for a description of these commodity sectors and distribution of the global supply and demand of each
of the commodities.
215.3 The drivers of oil market variables
In this subsection, we assess how much of the variation in oil market variables (oil prices, oil
inventories, and oil production) over the sample is accounted for by each of the shocks analyzed.
The variance decomposition for oil prices is shown in Table 6. The ￿rst point to note is that the
results are quite stable with respect to the FAVAR with three shocks shown in Table 4. It is generally
suggested that identifying more shocks tends to narrow the set of valid impulse response functions.
However, in our case, identifying an additional shock does not alter the results, suggesting that
we are pinning down the valid set of impulse responses. As before, global demand shocks are the
most important driver of oil prices, accounting for up to 45% of oil price ￿ uctuations. Speculative
shocks are the second most important driver, explaining up to 13% of oil price movements. The oil
inventory demand shock is particularly important on impact (13%) but decreases to 4% at longer
horizons. The oil supply shock is the least relevant driver, explaining less than 9% of the variation
in oil prices at all horizons.
[Table 6 about here]
Our results con￿rm Kilian￿ s (2009) conclusion that global demand shocks are the main drivers of
oil price ￿ uctuations. In addition, we show that speculative shocks are the second most important
driver of oil prices.
Given the importance attributed to the modeling of oil inventories (see Kilian and Murphy,
2011a), it is informative to show their variance decomposition, presented in Table 7. In the short
run, 22% of the variation in oil inventories is driven by oil supply shocks, consistent with production
smoothing in response to a supply shock. Interestingly, oil inventory demand explains up to 12% of
inventory ￿ uctuations. The global demand shock contributes up to 16% of inventory movements. In
turn, speculative shocks explain only 10% of the ￿ uctuations in oil inventories. At longer horizons,
the share of global demand declines to 9%, while the share of oil supply increases to 32%. The
explanatory power of oil inventory demand and speculative shocks is similar to the short-run case.
These results suggest that ￿ uctuations in oil inventories are due to oil inventory demand motives
as well as production smoothing in response to oil supply shocks. In this way, our ￿ndings are
consistent with those of Kilian and Murphy (2011a).
[Table 7 about here]
Table 8 presents the variance decomposition of oil production. On impact, oil supply shocks
explain around 35% of oil production ￿ uctuations. The speculative shock a⁄ects the incentives
faced by producers, who lower oil production in anticipation of perceived increases in the price of
22oil. Therefore, it is expected that speculative shocks play a role as a driver of oil production. In fact,
they explain around 20% of oil production ￿ uctuations. The large e⁄ect of speculative shocks on oil
production can be attributed to the fact that the speculative shock resembles a ￿managed supply￿
shock in the presence of higher expected prices. By contrast, the supply shock is a disruption, and
therefore, it is large on impact but it slowly reverts. The fact that the speculative shock accounts for
a larger share of the variance decomposition of oil production than oil inventory demand emphasizes
that the channel of adjustment through below ground inventories is playing an important role. This
is not surprising given that below ground inventories are generally less costly than above ground
inventories.
[Table 8 about here]
5.4 Speculation and oil prices in the past decade
In the previous subsection we showed how much of the variation in oil prices is explained by each
shock. We note here that this is an average measure for the entire period analyzed and consequently
does not provide information on whether the ￿nancialization of commodity markets in recent years
led to an increase in the price of oil. In order to investigate this possibility, it is instructive to
calculate the historical decomposition of the oil price to the 4 shocks identi￿ed. Figure 4 presents
the results.
[Figure 4 about here]
Figure 4 shows that global demand, and therefore real forces, were the main drivers of oil price
increases. We also observe that speculation was responsible for a large proportion of the oil price
increase between 2004 and 2007. The Figure suggests that speculation contributed around 15%
to oil price increases in this period. It is interesting that the speculative shock begins to play a
relevant role as a driver of oil price increases in 2004, which is when signi￿cant index investment
started to ￿ ow into commodities markets (see Tang and Xiong, 2011). This ￿nding con￿rms that
we are picking up the form of speculative shock resulting from the ￿nancialization of commodity
markets. The trend in prices due to global demand clearly started before 2004. This could have
been a triggering factor to speculative forces given that speculation is likely to rise when demand
is increasing (see Singleton, 2011, and Tang and Xiong, 2011). Another feature of interest is that
the contribution of speculative shocks to oil price increases becomes ￿ atter from 2007 until 2008.
This highlights that the gains from speculation decrease as the oil price goes up.29
29Let us illustrate this claim with a simple example that applies to contango periods like the one observed in
2004-2007. Suppose that the spot price is 30 USD, the 1 year forward price is 60 USD, the interest rate is 10%, and
23We note that the period in which speculation plays a key role in oil price ￿ uctuations (2004-
2007) coincides with contango in the futures market (as documented, for example, in Singleton
2011). During this period the term structure of oil future contracts has a positive slope, suggesting
that prices are expected to be higher. Hamilton (2009b) analyzes the contango and backwardation
periods in the oil market and illustrates that in 2008 speculation did not play a role in the oil price
increase. Our results are in line with his analysis given that the contribution of speculative shocks
to oil ￿ uctuations becomes ￿ at in 2008, coincidentally in the period in which the market enters
backwardation.
Another aspect to emphasize is that oil inventory demand shocks would have implied basically
no ￿ uctuations in the oil price between 2004 and mid-2006. These years are associated with the
start of the surge in oil prices. This shock, however, accounted for a large share of the spike in
2006-2007. We also note that very little of the decline during the recent recession is due to oil
inventory demand shocks.
The V-shaped decline in the real price of oil in late 2008 is driven mainly by the recession
associated with the global ￿nancial crisis, and re￿ ected by the global demand shock. However, the
speculation shock also played a signi￿cant role in the V-shaped decline as the ￿nancial crisis hurt
the risk appetite of ￿nancial investors for commodities in their portfolios (see Tang and Xiong,
2011), consequently pushing prices down.
The historical decomposition also helps to explain the developments in the physical side of the
oil market in the last decade. For example, Hamilton (2009b) observes that the growing demand
of the past ten years was linked to a stagnant supply. Our model suggests that the reason for more
stable oil production can be found in rising expectations of future spot prices, which undermined
the incentives of producers to accommodate demand.
Some observers of the oil market have tended to disregard the idea that speculation played an
important role in the last decade by pointing out that the level of inventories did not rise over this
period (see Irwin and Sanders, 2010). With respect to this, we underline that, in the absence of
any speculative reason for raising inventories, the strong increase in global demand over the past
decade (coupled with stagnant supply) would have implied a reduction in the level of stocks. Again,
we reconcile this pattern with global demand driving inventories down but speculation leading to
an increase in storage. Therefore, our model o⁄ers a consistent explanation of the developments in
the physical side of the market.
there are no storage costs. An investor would borrow 30 USD, buy oil, wait for delivery and sell it for 60 USD. The
total cost for the investor is 33, and the revenue is 27. Now assume that the forward curve shifts upwards, so that
the spot price is 100 USD and the forward price is 130 USD. In this case the total cost for the investor is 110 USD,
and the revenue is 20 USD.
245.5 Robustness
The oil market has witnessed substantial changes over the sample period. Baumeister and Peersman
(2010) document that oil supply shocks are characterized by a much smaller impact on world oil
production and a greater e⁄ect on the real price of crude oil since the second half of the 1980s.
In addition, futures markets were not developed until the 1980s. This feature is of relevance to
us because we want to understand the role of speculation in driving oil prices, and the interaction
between traders and producers that we describe accords better with a subperiod in which investment
in futures markets play a role. We also note that the period starting with the great-moderation
may involve di⁄erent structural characteristics that may a⁄ect the transmission of shocks.
It is natural to ask whether these changes a⁄ected the way oil shocks a⁄ect the economy.
Therefore, we estimate the FAVAR for a subsample starting in 1986. We chose 1986 as the date to
split our sample because this is the year in which oil prices stabilize and go back to pre-1973 levels,
and it also captures the great moderation and the development in futures markets. Peersman and
VanRobays (2010) chose a comparable sample split.
Appendix F compares the impulse responses and historical decomposition for the benchmark
results and the subperiod starting in 1986. Some results are of interest. The comparison of the
impulse responses for the two periods reveals that the transmission of shocks remains very stable.
The historical decomposition is very robust to the subsample analysis, with the speculative shock
playing a slightly more important role from 2004 to 2008 while the impact of the other shocks is
almost identical. The fact that the speculative shock exerts a larger in￿ uence in the 1986 subsample
suggests that, if anything, we might be understating the importance of speculation over the last
decade.
6 Conclusion
The increase in oil prices in 2004 coincided with a large ￿ ow of investment into commodity markets
and an increased price comovement between di⁄erent commodities. One of the objectives of this
paper is to analyze the sources of these price increases and assess whether speculation played a key
role in driving this empirical pattern.
We use a FAVAR model to identify oil shocks from a large dataset, including both macroeco-
nomic and ￿nancial variables of the G7 countries and a rich set of commodity prices. This method
is motivated by showing that the small scale VAR is not informationally su¢ cient to identify the
shocks. Therefore, we use a set of factors to summarize the bulk of aggregate ￿ uctuations in our
data. The ￿rst two factors capture complementary measures of real activity, and the remaining
two are associated with ￿nancial variables. The inclusion of a large information set matters. The
25FAVAR model proposed in this paper implies a smaller role for global demand shocks in explaining
￿ uctuations in the real price of oil than VAR estimates.
Consistent with previous studies, we ￿nd that oil prices have been historically driven by the
strength of global demand. However, speculation contributed to the oil price increase between 2004
and 2008. Our analysis pins down the start of speculative forces driving oil prices to 2004, which
is when signi￿cant investment started to ￿ ow into commodity markets. We ￿nd that the decline in
the real price of oil in late 2008 is driven mainly by the negative global demand shock associated
with the recession after the ￿nancial crisis. The speculative shock also played a signi￿cant role in
the decline as the ￿nancial crisis eroded the balance sheets of many ￿nancial institutions, which
in turn a⁄ected their demand for commodity assets in their portfolio, consequently pushing prices
down.
When we analyze the conditional correlations between oil prices and the prices of other com-
modities, we ￿nd that the largest correlations are in response to global demand shocks, consistent
with Kilian (2009). Interestingly, the speculative shock is also associated with a positive comove-
ment between oil prices and prices of other commodities. This ￿nding is consistent with the results
of Tang and Xiong (2011) and further supports the idea that the speculation shock that we iden-
tify is picking up the e⁄ects of ￿nancialization driven by the rapid growth of commodity index
investment. The correlation between oil prices and the prices of other commodities is negative for
the other shocks; this implies that it is unlikely that they are responsible for the comovement in
commodity prices.
Our results highlight a major challenge faced by policymakers in the medium to long-run:
Although speculation played a signi￿cant role, the high oil prices witnessed in the past decade are
mainly due to demand pressures, which are likely to resurge with the recovery of the world economy.
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32Table 1. Test for Su¢ cient Information
Panel A. 4 variable-VAR with aggregate industrial production
VAR VAR+1F VAR+2F VAR+3F VAR+4F
1F 0.0233 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
2F 0.0100 0.1133 ￿ ￿ ￿
3F 0.0033 0.2333 0.4433 ￿ ￿
4F 0.0067 0.0167 0.0233 0.0000 ￿
5F 0.0200 0.0200 0.0033 0.0000 0.1433
6F 0.0300 0.0167 0.0000 0.0000 0.1200
Panel B. 4 variable-VAR with Kilian measure of real global economic activity
VAR VAR+1F VAR+2F VAR+3F VAR+4F
1F 0.0400 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
2F 0.0033 0.0133 ￿ ￿ ￿
3F 0.0033 0.0033 0.0733 ￿ ￿
4F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0067 ￿
5F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0200 0.0133 0.1333
6F 0.0033 0.0300 0.1600 0.0100 0.3500
Notes: Bootstrapped p-values of the Granger causality test for the VAR and VAR augmented with
factors. Based on the Gelper and Croux (2007) multivariate extension of the out-of-sample Granger-causality
test. Corresponds to one-step-ahead forecasting and the forecasting evaluation period includes the last 15
years.
33Table 2. Evaluating Latent and Observed Factors
A(j) M(j) NS (j) R2 (j)
Oil production 0.793 38.776 6.112 0.140 (0.039-0.242)
Real oil prices 0.767 25.572 2.081 0.324 (0.203-0.445)
Oil inventories 0.916 83.424 28.093 0.034 (0.000-0.090)
Aggregate industrial production 0.567 9.495 0.289 0.775 (0.713-0.937)
Kilian measure of economic activity 0.709 15.752 1.101 0.475 (0.362-0.589)
Notes: The table reports Bai and Ng (2006)￿ s statistics to evaluate the extent to which observed factors
di⁄er from latent factors. A(j) is the frequency that the t-statistic j￿t(j)j exceeds the 5% asymptotic critical
value. M(j) is the maximum deviation of the statistic from zero (given the sample size the associated 5%
critical value is 3.6). NS (j) is de￿ned in Equation (4) and R2 (j) is de￿ned in Equation (5).
Table 3. Sign Restrictions
Shock Oil production Oil inventories Real oil prices Real activitya
Oil supply ￿ ￿ + ￿
Oil inventory demand + + + ￿
Global demand + + +
Speculative ￿ + +
Notes: All shocks are normalized to imply an increase in the price of oil. Blank entries denote that no
sign restriction is imposed. The sign restrictions are imposed only on impact.
a Sign restrictions for real activity are imposed jointly on aggregate industrial production and the Kilian
measure of economic activity.
34Table 4. Variance Decomposition of the Real Oil Price
Horizon Oil supply Oil inventory demand Global demand
1 VAR (KM) 0.0865 0.2850 0.5415
VAR (AIP) 0.1171 0.2937 0.4758
FAVAR 0.0609 0.1254 0.3769
2 VAR (KM) 0.0732 0.1997 0.6259
VAR (AIP) 0.1162 0.2379 0.5212
FAVAR 0.0443 0.0712 0.4242
3 VAR (KM) 0.0351 0.1623 0.6920
VAR (AIP) 0.0784 0.2528 0.5439
FAVAR 0.0297 0.0469 0.4461
4 VAR (KM) 0.0280 0.1361 0.7128
VAR (AIP) 0.0655 0.2805 0.5327
FAVAR 0.0272 0.0384 0.4449
8 VAR (KM) 0.0306 0.0687 0.7766
VAR (AIP) 0.0868 0.1846 0.5993
FAVAR 0.0573 0.0467 0.3834
12 VAR (KM) 0.0307 0.0837 0.7613
VAR (AIP) 0.0879 0.2019 0.5814
FAVAR 0.0951 0.0696 0.3372
Notes: VAR (KM) denotes that the VAR was estimated using the Kilian measure of real economic
activity. VAR (AIP) denotes that the VAR was estimated using aggregate industrial production.
Table 5. Orthogonality Test
# of factors Oil supply Oil inventory demand Global demand
1 0.0000 0.0180 0.0020
2 0.3470 0.1710 0.4440
3 0.3590 0.3870 0.2240
4 0.0010 0.8600 0.5860
Notes: Percentage of rejection of the F-test of orthogonality (at the 10% level) for each of the shocks
identi￿ed from the VAR with sign restrictions.
35Table 6. Variance Decomposition of the Oil Price (FAVAR)
Horizon Oil supply Oil inventory demand Aggregate demand Speculative
1 0.0638 0.1315 0.3924 0.0900
2 0.0459 0.0742 0.4378 0.0984
3 0.0289 0.0475 0.4596 0.1095
4 0.0253 0.0388 0.4555 0.1269
8 0.0484 0.0464 0.4078 0.1043
12 0.0842 0.0677 0.3595 0.0924
Table 7. Variance Decomposition of Inventories (FAVAR)
Horizon Oil Supply Oil inventory demand Aggregate demand Speculative
1 0.2196 0.1230 0.1612 0.0858
2 0.2241 0.1456 0.1289 0.1012
3 0.2538 0.1407 0.1069 0.0978
4 0.3031 0.1436 0.0897 0.0778
8 0.3228 0.0992 0.1166 0.0958
12 0.3162 0.1281 0.0866 0.0828
Table 8. Variance Decomposition of Oil Production (FAVAR)
Horizon Oil Supply Oil inventory demand Aggregate demand Speculative
1 0.3500 0.0023 0.0064 0.1885
2 0.1913 0.0294 0.0914 0.2009
3 0.1273 0.0467 0.1153 0.2112
4 0.1200 0.0400 0.0929 0.2487
8 0.0834 0.1360 0.0924 0.2367
12 0.0956 0.1635 0.0741 0.2169
36Figure 1. Factor Fit for Measures of Real Economic Activity




























Notes: The ￿gure shows each measure of economic activity together with the projection of the variable on
the factor with the highest explanatory power and the projection of the variable on all four latent factors.
1Figure 2. Impulse Responses: Main Variables
Notes: The ￿gure shows the impulse responses to oil supply, oil inventory demand, global demand, and
speculative shocks using a FAVAR with sign restrictions. The solid lines are the median impulse responses and
the shaded areas represent the 16th and 84th percentile bootstrapped error bands.


























































Notes: The ￿gure shows the correlation of the real oil price with di⁄erent portfolios of commodity indexes,
calculated as an equal-weighted real price index for each commodity sector. The sectors are: industrial metals,
soft, grains, and precious metals. Industrial metals include copper, aluminium, nickel, iron ore, and zinc; softs
are composed of cotton, tobacco, sugar, co⁄ee, and cacao; grains are sun￿ ower oil, palm oil, soybeans, wheat,
rice, and maize; precious metals include gold and silver.
3Figure 4. Historical Decomposition of the Oil Price for the Last Decade
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.B Appendix: Choice of Factors
In this appendix we show the 4-variable VAR speci￿cation with aggregate industrial production.
The results from the information su¢ ciency test reported in Section 3.2. suggest that the di⁄erences
across models are statistically signi￿cant.
Figure B1. Impulse Responses for Di⁄erent Choices of Factors
Notes: The ￿gure shows the impulse responses to oil supply, oil inventory demand, and global demand
shocks estimated using sign restrictions for a di⁄erent choice of factors.Appendix C. Empirical Factors
VARIABLES TEST ON FIT FIT OF FACTORS (R2)
A(j) M(j) NS(j) R2 Con￿dence Interval F1 F2 F3 F4
Oil and Aggregate Variables
World oil production 0.794 38.777 6.113 0.141 [0.039; 0.242] 0.081 0.038 0.001 0.020
Aggregate industrial production 0.568 9.495 0.290 0.775 [0.713; 0.838] 0.597 0.133 0.025 0.020
Average world price of oil 0.768 25.573 2.081 0.325 [0.203; 0.446] 0.207 0.069 0.020 0.028
Inventories of oil 0.916 83.424 28.094 0.034 [0.000; 0.091] 0.006 0.022 0.002 0.005
Oil price spot-future spread 0.879 29.794 5.860 0.146 [0.022; 0.269] 0.080 0.020 0.035 0.001
Index of global economic activity 0.710 15.753 1.101 0.476 [0.362; 0.590] 0.081 0.354 0.016 0.024
Commodity Prices
Gold 0.735 13.700 1.759 0.362 [0.242; 0.483] 0.067 0.021 0.263 0.010
Silver 0.735 28.865 3.393 0.228 [0.112; 0.344] 0.112 0.001 0.112 0.003
Copper 0.677 15.090 1.035 0.492 [0.379; 0.604] 0.326 0.021 0.100 0.044
Aluminium 0.684 15.152 1.453 0.408 [0.289; 0.527] 0.228 0.029 0.090 0.060
Nickel 0.735 23.451 2.388 0.295 [0.175; 0.416] 0.147 0.034 0.012 0.102
Iron Ore 0.742 88.444 9.441 0.096 [0.008; 0.184] 0.069 0.001 0.016 0.010
Zinc 0.787 28.644 2.604 0.277 [0.158; 0.397] 0.206 0.034 0.006 0.031
Rubber 0.748 18.953 1.443 0.409 [0.290; 0.528] 0.288 0.013 0.099 0.009
Timber 0.781 40.907 9.537 0.095 [0.007; 0.183] 0.015 0.001 0.014 0.066
Cotton 0.916 49.970 5.916 0.145 [0.042; 0.247] 0.136 0.001 0.007 0.001
Tobacco 0.910 97.210 33.891 0.029 [0.000; 0.080] 0.013 0.015 0.000 0.000
Sun￿ower oil 0.897 57.433 6.553 0.132 [0.033; 0.232] 0.081 0.026 0.011 0.014
Palm oil 0.858 39.784 3.752 0.210 [0.096; 0.324] 0.194 0.002 0.008 0.006
Sugar 0.839 29.999 4.475 0.183 [0.073; 0.293] 0.056 0.047 0.076 0.004
Soybeans 0.884 63.522 7.845 0.113 [0.019; 0.207] 0.088 0.003 0.014 0.008
Wheat 0.868 50.020 9.601 0.094 [0.006; 0.183] 0.062 0.006 0.026 0.000
Rice 0.806 39.579 4.763 0.174 [0.065; 0.282] 0.097 0.029 0.032 0.016
Maize 0.897 69.928 8.444 0.106 [0.014; 0.197] 0.092 0.002 0.011 0.000
Co⁄ee 0.910 91.429 18.811 0.050 [0.000; 0.118] 0.033 0.015 0.003 0.000
Cacao 0.742 20.356 4.607 0.178 [0.069; 0.288] 0.059 0.001 0.046 0.072
Real GDP
U.S. 0.684 14.458 0.721 0.581 [0.481; 0.682] 0.244 0.255 0.073 0.009
U.K. 0.632 23.474 1.729 0.366 [0.246; 0.487] 0.183 0.177 0.002 0.004
France 0.806 12.514 0.828 0.547 [0.442; 0.653] 0.521 0.009 0.014 0.004
Germany 0.839 33.166 2.767 0.265 [0.146; 0.385] 0.243 0.020 0.002 0.000
Italy 0.813 14.257 1.095 0.477 [0.364; 0.591] 0.439 0.000 0.031 0.007
Canada 0.690 15.977 1.094 0.478 [0.364; 0.591] 0.317 0.080 0.068 0.012
Japan 0.787 21.725 2.477 0.288 [0.167; 0.408] 0.159 0.074 0.011 0.043
Personal Consumption
U.S. 0.665 9.934 0.725 0.580 [0.479; 0.680] 0.009 0.523 0.018 0.030
U.K. 0.781 29.041 3.854 0.206 [0.093; 0.320] 0.063 0.124 0.008 0.010
France 0.897 32.081 4.467 0.183 [0.073; 0.293] 0.090 0.027 0.011 0.054
Germany 0.935 406.505 116.236 0.009 [0.000; 0.037] 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003
Italy 0.800 24.488 2.578 0.279 [0.160; 0.399] 0.251 0.000 0.027 0.001
Canada 0.819 30.780 4.039 0.198 [0.086; 0.311] 0.085 0.096 0.000 0.017
Japan 0.858 46.249 7.517 0.117 [0.022; 0.213] 0.005 0.107 0.005 0.000
Industrial Production
U.S. 0.542 8.530 0.343 0.745 [0.675; 0.814] 0.473 0.136 0.105 0.030
U.K. 0.755 33.602 2.786 0.264 [0.145; 0.383] 0.183 0.072 0.010 0.000
France 0.690 15.116 0.789 0.559 [0.455; 0.633] 0.511 0.036 0.011 0.001
Germany 0.735 19.140 1.077 0.481 [0.368; 0.595] 0.426 0.038 0.000 0.018
Italy 0.768 28.662 1.334 0.428 [0.311; 0.546] 0.412 0.002 0.015 0.000
Canada 0.613 17.939 0.948 0.513 [0.404; 0.623] 0.309 0.084 0.067 0.054
Japan 0.561 14.802 0.705 0.587 [0.487; 0.686] 0.519 0.029 0.005 0.034
Notes: This table reports the Bai and Ng (2006) statistics to evaluate the extent to which observed factors di⁄er from latent factors.
Bold numbers indicate an R2>0:100:VARIABLES TEST ON FIT FIT OF FACTORS (R2)
A(j) M(j) NS(j) R2 Con￿dence Interval F1 F2 F3 F4
Employment
U.S. 0.581 12.607 0.591 0.629 [0.536; 0.721] 0.376 0.096 0.107 0.049
U.K. 0.832 19.379 1.849 0.351 [0.230; 0.472] 0.257 0.042 0.016 0.036
France 0.929 80.159 24.609 0.039 [0.000; 0.099] 0.015 0.005 0.011 0.007
Germany 0.819 41.188 6.660 0.131 [0.032; 0.229] 0.072 0.010 0.046 0.002
Italy 0.910 39.624 7.209 0.122 [0.025; 0.218] 0.041 0.027 0.049 0.005
Canada 0.684 16.768 1.137 0.468 [0.353; 0.583] 0.379 0.020 0.043 0.025
Japan 0.961 61.572 26.965 0.036 [0.000; 0.093] 0.013 0.009 0.003 0.010
Unemployment
U.S. 0.561 8.957 0.347 0.742 [0.673; 0.812] 0.434 0.152 0.110 0.046
U.K. 0.755 16.039 1.706 0.370 [0.249; 0.490] 0.253 0.052 0.041 0.024
France 0.845 39.282 5.020 0.166 [0.059; 0.273] 0.161 0.000 0.001 0.004
Germany 0.897 50.549 5.166 0.162 [0.056; 0.268] 0.132 0.000 0.012 0.018
Italy 0.942 52.812 12.647 0.073 [0.000; 0.152] 0.026 0.042 0.000 0.005
Canada 0.781 20.277 1.229 0.449 [0.332; 0.565] 0.377 0.038 0.013 0.021
Japan 0.865 43.727 3.799 0.208 [0.095; 0.322] 0.195 0.007 0.005 0.002
Employee Earnings
U.S. 0.935 54.904 23.846 0.040 [0.000; 0.101] 0.006 0.018 0.015 0.002
U.K. 0.801 27.695 8.190 0.109 [0.015; 0.203] 0.000 0.016 0.070 0.021
France 0.709 29.413 2.424 0.292 [0.170; 0.414] 0.117 0.160 0.000 0.020
Germany 0.839 38.143 11.013 0.083 [0.000; 0.167] 0.009 0.017 0.056 0.001
Italy 0.921 83.645 23.708 0.040 [0.000; 0.102] 0.007 0.025 0.008 0.001
Canada 0.819 33.615 6.832 0.128 [0.030; 0.226] 0.033 0.018 0.001 0.075
Japan 0.887 94.312 11.297 0.081 [0.000; 0.165] 0.074 0.004 0.003 0.003
CPI
U.S. 0.690 12.563 0.763 0.567 [0.464; 0.670] 0.403 0.125 0.039 0.000
U.K. 0.710 31.445 4.441 0.184 [0.074; 0.294] 0.017 0.141 0.012 0.014
France 0.658 14.076 0.821 0.549 [0.444; 0.654] 0.241 0.304 0.004 0.001
Germany 0.748 29.889 2.989 0.251 [0.133; 0.369] 0.150 0.067 0.002 0.032
Italy 0.690 16.418 1.440 0.410 [0.291; 0.529] 0.106 0.273 0.028 0.003
Canada 0.897 41.454 5.251 0.160 [0.054; 0.266] 0.075 0.085 0.000 0.000
Japan 0.710 15.577 1.182 0.458 [0.343; 0.574] 0.216 0.181 0.006 0.055
PPI
U.S. 0.677 21.144 1.145 0.466 [0.351; 0.581] 0.406 0.021 0.038 0.002
U.K. 0.677 30.471 5.724 0.149 [0.045; 0.252] 0.000 0.003 0.048 0.097
France 0.556 13.865 0.412 0.708 [0.587; 0.829] 0.561 0.016 0.002 0.016
Germany 0.606 11.138 0.442 0.694 [0.613; 0.774] 0.554 0.125 0.005 0.009
Italy 0.667 16.040 0.985 0.504 [0.373; 0.635] 0.410 0.045 0.007 0.030
Canada 0.774 27.251 1.807 0.356 [0.235; 0.477] 0.220 0.066 0.000 0.070
Japan 0.632 11.313 0.857 0.539 [0.432; 0.645] 0.412 0.056 0.005 0.066
Overnight Rates
U.S. 0.671 22.989 1.632 0.380 [0.260; 0.500] 0.267 0.004 0.105 0.004
U.K. 0.836 60.518 8.680 0.103 [0.012; 0.195] 0.071 0.022 0.000 0.010
France 0.645 19.267 1.368 0.422 [0.304; 0.541] 0.194 0.169 0.044 0.015
Germany 0.755 29.385 2.554 0.281 [0.161; 0.401] 0.176 0.067 0.034 0.003
Italy 0.755 38.823 3.166 0.240 [0.123; 0.357] 0.107 0.114 0.006 0.013
Canada 0.710 27.927 3.338 0.231 [0.114; 0.347] 0.050 0.053 0.124 0.004
Japan 0.665 16.381 1.388 0.419 [0.300; 0.537] 0.052 0.309 0.057 0.000
10-Year Rates
U.S. 0.742 18.109 2.413 0.293 [0.172; 0.413] 0.133 0.021 0.111 0.028
U.K. 0.774 21.782 2.424 0.292 [0.172; 0.412] 0.146 0.094 0.035 0.017
France 0.768 15.938 1.295 0.436 [0.318; 0.553] 0.154 0.240 0.036 0.006
Germany 0.735 13.854 1.132 0.469 [0.354; 0.583] 0.296 0.089 0.076 0.009
Italy 0.665 23.100 2.175 0.315 [0.194; 0.436] 0.020 0.262 0.029 0.004
Canada 0.703 16.983 1.851 0.351 [0.230; 0.472] 0.116 0.059 0.170 0.005
Japan 0.903 74.418 9.741 0.093 [0.006; 0.180] 0.088 0.005 0.000 0.000
Notes: This table reports the Bai and Ng (2006) statistics to evaluate the extent to which observed factors di⁄er from latent factors.
Bold numbers indicate an R2 > 0:100:VARIABLES TEST ON FIT FIT OF FACTORS (R2)
A(j) M(j) NS(j) R2 Con￿dence Interval F1 F2 F3 F4
M1
U.S. 0.684 17.338 1.648 0.378 [0.257; 0.498] 0.133 0.122 0.011 0.112
U.K. 0.737 22.497 2.051 0.328 [0.205; 0.450] 0.000 0.282 0.002 0.041
France 0.871 39.495 5.873 0.145 [0.043; 0.248] 0.007 0.122 0.002 0.015
Germany 0.761 37.812 3.558 0.219 [0.104; 0.335] 0.034 0.142 0.041 0.002
Italy 0.821 35.215 9.553 0.095 [0.002; 0.187] 0.000 0.062 0.008 0.025
Canada 0.748 17.242 2.184 0.314 [0.193; 0.435] 0.015 0.209 0.081 0.009
Japan 0.853 51.049 6.365 0.136 [0.031; 0.240] 0.011 0.119 0.000 0.012
M2
U.S. 0.665 10.918 0.799 0.556 [0.452; 0.660] 0.128 0.258 0.000 0.170
U.K. 0.743 20.987 4.288 0.189 [0.057; 0.321] 0.003 0.135 0.004 0.013
France 0.877 25.122 4.463 0.183 [0.073; 0.293] 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.070
Germany 0.819 43.046 8.980 0.100 [0.011; 0.190] 0.009 0.001 0.023 0.067
Italy 0.850 55.847 10.135 0.090 [0.000; 0.180] 0.006 0.059 0.015 0.011
Canada 0.839 24.440 7.887 0.113 [0.019; 0.206] 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.100
Japan 0.787 21.012 2.581 0.279 [0.159; 0.399] 0.006 0.245 0.014 0.014
Trade Balance
U.S. 0.858 28.889 3.842 0.207 [0.093; 0.320] 0.174 0.003 0.008 0.022
U.K. 0.768 29.006 4.373 0.186 [0.076; 0.297] 0.049 0.002 0.004 0.130
France 0.935 37.572 5.628 0.151 [0.047; 0.255] 0.096 0.046 0.008 0.000
Germany 0.916 76.160 27.234 0.035 [0.000; 0.093] 0.022 0.001 0.005 0.007
Italy 0.910 49.178 9.349 0.097 [0.008; 0.185] 0.057 0.008 0.001 0.031
Canada 0.923 58.799 15.444 0.061 [0.000; 0.134] 0.044 0.000 0.002 0.015
Japan 0.787 20.731 4.093 0.196 [0.084; 0.308] 0.043 0.063 0.011 0.079
Stock Market Price Index
U.S. 0.484 6.996 0.562 0.640 [0.550; 0.731] 0.022 0.265 0.013 0.340
U.K. 0.555 8.662 0.700 0.588 [0.489; 0.688] 0.001 0.340 0.000 0.247
France 0.658 10.153 1.020 0.495 [0.383; 0.607] 0.040 0.232 0.000 0.223
Germany 0.574 10.162 1.047 0.489 [0.376; 0.601] 0.014 0.155 0.007 0.313
Italy 0.671 15.597 2.024 0.331 [0.209; 0.452] 0.062 0.091 0.012 0.166
Canada 0.529 11.637 0.894 0.528 [0.420; 0.636] 0.072 0.156 0.036 0.264
Japan 0.677 15.474 1.352 0.425 [0.307; 0.543] 0.076 0.193 0.007 0.149
REER
U.S. 0.452 7.005 0.371 0.730 [0.657; 0.802] 0.228 0.015 0.483 0.004
U.K. 0.755 13.089 2.549 0.282 [0.162; 0.402] 0.019 0.000 0.027 0.236
France 0.766 17.916 4.443 0.184 [0.062; 0.305] 0.005 0.000 0.093 0.110
Germany 0.555 11.199 1.282 0.438 [0.309; 0.567] 0.000 0.000 0.300 0.176
Italy 0.836 47.557 21.546 0.044 [0.000; 0.144] 0.006 0.000 0.028 0.000
Canada 0.716 11.323 1.537 0.394 [0.274; 0.514] 0.097 0.012 0.001 0.284
Japan 0.716 15.758 2.773 0.265 [0.146; 0.384] 0.010 0.019 0.006 0.230
Exchange Rate with Dollar
U.K. 0.587 8.131 0.829 0.547 [0.441; 0.652] 0.097 0.009 0.391 0.050
France 0.529 6.218 0.603 0.624 [0.530; 0.717] 0.025 0.012 0.579 0.008
Germany 0.600 6.687 0.606 0.623 [0.529; 0.716] 0.039 0.002 0.561 0.021
Italy 0.535 7.712 0.644 0.608 [0.512; 0.704] 0.022 0.021 0.565 0.001
Canada 0.594 10.633 1.030 0.493 [0.381; 0.605] 0.139 0.005 0.130 0.218
Japan 0.735 13.162 2.255 0.307 [0.186; 0.428] 0.000 0.047 0.145 0.115
Spread 3m / Overnight rate
U.S. 0.697 10.918 1.154 0.464 [0.349; 0.579] 0.001 0.400 0.049 0.014
U.K. 0.855 29.481 4.606 0.178 [0.068; 0.289] 0.051 0.097 0.010 0.020
France 0.741 32.633 2.645 0.274 [0.134; 0.415] 0.249 0.009 0.021 0.014
Germany 0.761 25.370 2.959 0.253 [0.134; 0.371] 0.039 0.171 0.017 0.026
Italy 0.910 23.706 7.179 0.122 [0.026; 0.219] 0.006 0.014 0.082 0.020
Canada 0.858 67.328 6.101 0.141 [0.039; 0.242] 0.135 0.002 0.004 0.000
Japan 0.800 19.070 2.465 0.289 [0.168; 0.409] 0.034 0.163 0.008 0.083
Spread 10y / Overnight rate
U.S. 0.748 12.714 1.164 0.462 [0.347; 0.577] 0.027 0.328 0.086 0.022
U.K. 0.868 44.622 14.521 0.064 [0.000; 0.140] 0.013 0.013 0.022 0.017
France 0.759 20.000 1.686 0.372 [0.230; 0.514] 0.053 0.249 0.030 0.002
Germany 0.800 17.998 2.487 0.287 [0.166; 0.407] 0.045 0.240 0.002 0.000
Italy 0.831 37.367 8.004 0.111 [0.000; 0.234] 0.013 0.009 0.037 0.048
Canada 0.839 21.683 4.482 0.182 [0.072; 0.292] 0.016 0.123 0.023 0.020
Japan 0.821 15.292 4.909 0.169 [0.023; 0.315] 0.003 0.117 0.017 0.001
Notes: This table reports the Bai and Ng (2006) statistics to evaluate the extent to which observed factors di⁄er from latent factors.
Bold numbers indicate an R2 > 0:100:D Appendix: Impulse Responses VAR and FAVAR
Figure D1. Impulse Responses: VAR (with real economic activity)
Notes: The ￿gure shows the impulse responses to oil supply, oil inventory demand, and global demand
shocks using a VAR with sign restrictions. The solid lines are the median impulse responses and the shaded areas
represent the 16th and 84th percentile bootstrapped error bands.Figure D2. Impulse Responses: VAR (with aggregate industrial production)
Notes: The ￿gure shows the impulse responses to oil supply, oil inventory demand, and global demand
shocks using a VAR with sign restrictions. The solid lines are the median impulse responses and the shaded areas
represent the 16th and 84th percentile bootstrapped error bands.Figure D3. Impulse Responses: FAVAR
Notes: The ￿gure shows the impulse responses to oil supply, oil inventory demand, and global demand
shocks using a FAVAR with sign restrictions. The solid lines are the median impulse responses and the shaded
areas represent the 16th and 84th percentile bootstrapped error bands.E Appendix: A Simpli￿ed Model of the Oil Market
This appendix presents a very stylized model of the oil market that provides insights about the
propagation of the shocks identi￿ed in our paper.
The Demand for Oil
In what follows we summarize the main equations that determine the demand for oil. Detailed
derivations can be found in Hamilton (2009a). The demand for oil originates from the demand of
gasoline retailers. In fact, oil (Xt) is used as an intermediate input for the production of gasoline, whose
real price is Gt: F (Xt;It) is the production function and depends on the current level of inventories,






Equation (1) is the optimal demand schedule for crude oil by gasoline retailers. It states that the
marginal productivity of oil has to be equal to the relative price (with respect to gasoline). This is
nothing more than the usual result that under perfect competition marginal productivity is equal to
marginal costs. Optimal inventory management implies that:
Pt + C0 (It+1) =
Gt+1F0
I (Xt+1;It+1) + Pt+1
1 + rt
: (2)
From Equation (2) it follows that if ￿rms buy one more unit of oil today to store as inventory, incurring
a (marginal) cost of Pt + C0 (It+1); this will lower next period￿ s cost by Gt+1F
0
I (Xt+1;It+1) + Pt+1.
Therefore, current oil production is either consumed for the production of gasoline or stored as
inventories (for future production of gasoline). This implies that mismatches between time-t production
(Qt) and consumption (Xt) of oil are re￿ ected in changes in the stock of inventories:
￿It+1 = Qt ￿ Xt: (3)







where ￿t is capturing the systematic (inelastic) demand for gasoline, as well as a random component
that can be interpreted as an aggregate demand shock.









1Including inventories as a state variable in the production function is a short-cut to produce positive convenience
yields and therefore positive holding of inventories in every period.
2The demand for gasoline can be easily derived from a utility maximization where gasoline is a ￿nal good that produces
utility to the households (see, e.g., Nakov and Nuno, 2011).Note that (for ￿ > 0) this is downward sloping, with crude oil prices inversely related to total crude
consumed in the same period. In addition, this relation depends also on the current stock of inventories.
The inverse demand function of inventories can be found from (2) as
Pt =
Gt+1F0
I (Xt+1;It+1) + Pt+1
1 + rt
￿ C0 (It+1);
therefore implying a downward sloping demand It+1 = DInv (Pt;Pt+1;Gt+1;Xt+1;rt); where Pt+1 acts
as a forward shifter of the curve (i.e. D0
Inv;Pt+1 > 0). Similarly, (5) also implies a downward sloping
demand curve, Xt = DCons (Pt;￿t;It); however this does not depend on the future price level.
The total demand function for oil can be found substituting (5) and (2) into (3), which gives a
relation that is a function of prices (Pt and Pt+1) and quantity produced (Qt) (depending also on the
accumulated stock of inventories):
Qt = DInv (Pt;Pt+1;Gt+1;Xt+1;rt) ￿ It + DCons (Pt;￿t;It): (6)
This shows that a shift in the future oil price manifests itself into a shift in demand, speci￿cally into
an increase in the demand for inventories (Hamilton, 2009a, and Kilian and Murphy, 2011a).3
Modeling Oil Extraction
In this section we discuss the producer problem and derive optimal oil extraction.4
Denote with Qt the production or extraction of oil in period t, and de￿ne with Qt the cumulative
extraction at the end of period t, so that: Qt =
Pt
￿=0 Q￿: Let <t be the amount of proven reserves
so that the total amount of the resources exploitable at time t is Rt = <t ￿ Qt.5 Consider a typical
competitive owner of an exhaustible resource who can obtain the market price, Pt, for the resource at
time t. Her optimal extraction pro￿le, fQ￿;R￿g
T
￿=t, is obtained by maximizing the discounted stream






s=t (1 + rs)
[P￿Q￿ ￿ C (Q￿;Q￿)]; (7)
given the resource constraint
Rt = Rt￿1 ￿ Qt + et; (8)
where et = <t ￿ <t￿1 allows for the possibility that the total amount of proven reserves may vary
over time, either due to data revisions or because of new resource discoveries. In this way, et can be
considered as an exogenous ￿ ow supply shock.
3The demand function (6) sheds light into the propagation of other shocks. In fact, a ￿ ow demand shock incorporated
into ￿t implies an upward shift of the demand curve (speci￿cally a shift of current consumpion DCons). Moreover, any
shift of the convenience yield, such as the ones modelled in Alquist and Kilian (2010), also implies an increase in total
demand (speci￿cally the precautionary demand of oil DInv). Neither of these two shocks implies a contemporaneous shift
of the supply curve, as it will be clear from the next section.
4In this Appendix we refer to marginal changes in production for current wells in operation. Modeling the investment
decision of developing a new well is out of the scope of the current paper, and it is likely to depend on medium to long
run expectations of the oil price, which are longer than the typical length of a futures contract.
5Dating proven reserves at time t allows for the possibility that its total amont may vary over time, either due to data
revisions or because of new resource discoveries.Following Farzin (1992), the total extraction cost at time t is given by a twice continuously dif-
ferentiable function Ct = C (Qt;Qt). It follows that the total extraction cost increases both with the
current extraction rate (i.e. C0
Q > 0) and the cumulative extraction up to date (i.e. C0
Q > 0).6 In
view of geological and engineering knowledge about exploitation of depletable resources, one expects
the marginal extraction cost C0
Q to have the following properties: (i) diminishing returns to extraction
rate that cause the marginal extraction cost to rise as the extraction rate increases (C00
QQ > 0); (ii)
depletion e⁄ect that raises the marginal cost of maintaining a given rate of extraction as increasing
amounts of resource are depleted (C00
QQ > 0). It is also usually postulated that the incremental cost due
to cumulative extraction rises not only with the extraction rate (C00
QQ > 0), but also with the amount
already extracted (C00
QQ > 0) (see, e.g. Pindyck 1978).
The ￿rst order conditions from the above optimization problem imply








The lagrangian multiplier ￿t (< 0) is the shadow cost associated with the cumulative extraction up to t.
In equilibrium, it has to be equal to the discounted sum of the incremental costs that an additional unit
of resource extracted at time t brings about in that period and also spills over into all future periods







s=t (1 + rs)
:
Eliminating the multiplier yields
Pt ￿ C0






which is the optimality condition for the extraction rate, i.e. the condition required for optimal below
ground-inventory management. Note that if C0
Q = 0, then the relation above is the Hotelling Principle:
The price of the resource net of marginal extraction cost is expected to rise with the discount rate, r.
Clearly, if the ￿rm were to face an increase in price (Pt+1 > Pt), with all other prices remaining
constant, it would respond by decreasing the amount of current production, until the condition given
in equation (9) was restored.7
6For example, abstracting from technology developments, Favero and Pesaran (1994) show that an extraction cost
function quadratic in the rate of extraction (Qt) and linear in the level of remaining reserves (<t￿Rt), with the latter term




t +B (<t ￿ Rt)],
is the best-performing speci￿cation using North Sea data.
7The optimal supply schedule also shows that a decrease in et (an unexpected decrease in total available/exploitable
reserves), which might be caused by a war for instance, will increase the current marginal costs and therefore shift supply
down.The Impact E⁄ect of a Speculative Shock
The equilibrium is given by the intersection of the demand function, (6), with the supply function,
(9). We can think of a speculative shock as an unexpected increase in future prices, Pt+1, with respect
to current prices, Pt, where this may result from traders￿activity. If the retailers were to face an
increase in price (Pt+1 > Pt), with all other prices remaining constant, the demand for inventory would
increase (2), which would result in an upward shift of the demand curve. The increase in the demand for
inventories will create pressure to increase production, which is the standard e⁄ect of shift in demand
along an upward sloping supply curve. This case is depicted in Figure E1.8 At the same time, if oil
producers were to be misled by the increase in prices, it would clearly be optimal response for them to
hold production underground to increase it in the future. Facing an increase in price (Pt+1 > Pt), with
all other prices remaining constant, the supply curve shifts left, as producers respond by decreasing the
amount of current production until the condition given in equation (9) is restored.
A priori it is not clear whether the impact on oil production is positive or negative. This will depend
on the relative shift of the demand and supply curves, as well as the elasticities. In fact, the e⁄ect of
the supply shift should dominate the e⁄ect of a demand shift (for the sign of production) whenever the
supply curve is very steep.9 Clearly, the opposite movements of demand and supply will, in any case,
imply a large jump in the current oil price. Figure E2 shows the case when the response of production
is dominated by the incentives of producers to increase future revenues, as opposed to current revenues.
In the paper we have assumed that the speculative shock is associated with a decrease in production.
This is actually not clear a priori, and that is the reason why we refer to this case as a ￿ conjecture￿by
Hamilton (2009a). The model helps us understand what conditions are necessary for this to happen.
However, it could be the case that part of the speculative component is captured by the oil inventory
demand shock (as in Kilian and Murphy, 2011a). The fact that the implied path of the speculative
shock moves in line with anecdotal evidence on the role of speculation in the past decade (in terms of
timing, for instance) builds our con￿dence that the speculation shock is in fact capturing the e⁄ect of
exogenous shifts in expectations of futures prices. The fact that oil inventory demand captures shifts
in prices around well known episodes of increased uncertainty (such as the Iranian Revolution or the
￿rst Persian Gulf war) suggests that this shock is dominated by the precautionary demand motive (i.e.
a shift in demand not counteracted enough by a downward shift of supply, see Kilian and Murphy,
2011a).
8This is the case considered in Kilian and Murphy (2011a). However, it must be emphasized that a similar picture
would emerge as a result of a precautionary demand shock such as the one considered in Alquist and Kilian (2010), as
well as a result of an expeced shortfall in production (see 2 and 6).
9This would be true in the extreme case of a vertical supply.Figure E1. Oil Inventory Demand Shock Figure E2. Speculative ShockF Appendix: Subsample Analysis





























































































































































Notes: The ￿gure compares the impulse responses to oil supply, oil inventory demand, global demand, and
speculative shocks using the benchmark FAVAR with sign restrictions shown in Figure 2 (blue lines) and the
FAVAR for a subsample starting in 1986 (red lines). The solid lines are the median impulse responses and the
dashed lines represent the 16th and 84th percentile bootstrapped error bands.Figure F2. Historical Decomposition of the Oil Price: Benchmark and Subsample
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Notes: The ￿gure compares the historical decomposition of the oil price for the benchmark FAVAR shown
in Figure 4 (blue lines) and the FAVAR estimated for a subsample starting in 1986 (red lines).Annex 1: Elasticity Bounds
As we explain in Section 3.4., we impose an upper bound of 0.0257 for the response of the impact
elasticity of oil supply with respect to the real price jointly after both demand shocks. This bound is
proposed by Kilian and Murphy (2011b) and is designed for a monthly model. Since we have quarterly
data it is not clear whether the same restriction should be applied. Therefore, we check the robustness
of our results to a an elasticity bound of two and three times the Kilian and Murphy (2011b) value.
The impulse responses and historical decomposition are presented below.
Figure 1. Impulse Responses for Di⁄erent Elasticity Bounds
Notes: The ￿gure shows the impulse responses to oil supply, oil inventory demand, global demand, and
speculative shocks using a FAVAR with sign restrictions. Blue lines show our benchmark identi￿cation as in
Figure 2, red lines show the results for the Kilian and Murphy (2011b) elasticity bound multiplied by 2 and green
lines show the results for the Kilian and Murphy (2011b) elasiticy bound multiplied by 3. The solid lines are the
median impulse responses and the shaded area represents the 16th and 84th bootstrapped error bands.
1Figure 2. Historical Decomposition for Di⁄erent Elasticity Bounds
Notes: Blue lines show our benchmark identi￿cation as in Figure 4. Red lines and green lines show,
respectively, the results for the Kilian and Murphy (2011b) elasticity bound multiplied by 2 and 3.
2Annex 2: Pairwise correlations
Figure 1 presents the cross-sectional average pairwise correlation of all commodity prices in response
to the shocks identi￿ed. Two results are of interest. First, the correlations are positive for all shocks.
The largest response on impact occurs for the global demand shock. This con￿rms the nature of
the shock, which originates from an increase in demand for all commodities. The results using only
industrial commodities are quite similar.
Figure 1. Pariwise Correlation: All Commodities
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